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Abstract
A version of the secretary problem is considered. The ranks of items, whose val-
ues are independent, identically distributed random variables X1,X2, . . . ,Xn from
a uniform distribution on [0; 1], are observed sequentially by the grader. He has to
select exactly one item, when it appears, and receives a payoff which is a function
of the unobserved realization of random variable assigned to the item diminished
by some cost. The methods of analysis are based on the existence of an embedded
Markov chain and use the technique of backward induction. The result is a gen-
eralization of the selection model considered by Bearden (2006). The asymptotic
behaviour of the solution is also investigated.
Key words: optimal stopping, sequential search, secretary problem, rank-based
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1 Introduction
Although a version of the secretary problem (the beauty contest problem, the dowry
problem or the marriage problem) was first solved by Cayley (1875), it was not until
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five decades ago there had been sudden resurgence of interest in this problem. Since the
articles by Gardner (1960a,b) the secretary problem has been extended and generalized
in many different directions by Gilbert and Mosteller (1966). Excellent reviews of the
development of this colourful problem and its extensions have been given by Rose (1982b),
Freeman (1983), Samuels (1991) and Ferguson (1989). The classical secretary problem in
its simplest form can be formulated following Ferguson (1989). He defined the secretary
problem in its standard form to have the following features:
(i) There is only one secretarial position available.
(ii) The number of applicants, N , is known in advance.
(iii) The applicants are interviewed sequentially in a random order.
(iv) All the applicants can be ranked from the best to the worst without any ties. Further,
the decision to accept or to reject an applicant must be based solely on the relative
ranks of the interviewed applicants.
(v) An applicant once rejected cannot be recalled later. The employer is satisfied with
nothing but the very best.
(vi) The payoff is 1 if the best of the N applicants is chosen and 0 otherwise.
This model can be used as a model of choice in many decisions in everyday life, such as
buying a car, hiring an employee, or finding an apartment (see Corbin (1980)). The part
of research has been devoted to modified version of the problem where some important
assumption of the model has been changed to fit it to the real life context. There are
analysis of decision maker’s aims. It could be that he will be satisfied by chosing one of
the K best (see Gusein-Zade (1966), Frank and Samuels (1980)). It was shown that the
optimal strategy in this problem has very simple threshold form. The items are observed
and rejected up to some moments jr (thresholds) after which it is optimal to accept the
first candidate with relative rank r, r = 1, 2, . . . , K. The thresholds jr are decreasing on
r. This strategy is rather intuitive. When the candidates run low we admit acceptance
the lowest rank of chosen item. If the aim is to choose the second best item then the form
of the optimal strategy is not so intuitively obvious (see Szajowski (1982), Rose (1982a),
Mori (1985)). In the same time the possibility of backward solicitation and uncertain em-
ployment was also investigated (see Yang (1974), Smith and Deely (1975), Smith (1975)).
There are also experimental research with subjects confronted with the classical secretary
problem (see Seale and Rapoport (1997, 2000)). The optimal strategy of the grader in
the classical secretary problem is to pass k⋆N − 1 applicants, where k⋆N ∼= [Ne−1] and
stop at the first j ≥ k⋆N which is better that those seen so far. If none exists nothing is
chosen. The experimental study by Seale and Rapoport (1997) of this problem shows that
subjects under study have tendency to terminate their search earlier than in the optimal
strategy. Bearden (2006) has considered application the best choice problem to the model
of choice for the trader who makes her selling decision at each point in time solely on the
basis of the rank of the current price with respect to the previous prices, but, ultimately,
derive utility from the true value of the selected observation and not from its rank. The
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assumption (vi) is not fulfilled in this case. Bearden (2006) has made efforts to explain
this effect and the new payoff scheme has proposed. He shows that if the true values Xj
are i.i.d. uniformly distributed on [0, 1] then for every N the optimal strategy is to pass
c− 1 applicants, and stop with the first j ≥ c with rank 1. If none exists, stop at time N .
The optimal value of c is either ⌊√N⌋ or ⌈√N⌉.
This payoff scheme when the i.i.d. Xj ’s come from other than the uniform distribution has
been studied by Samuel-Cahn (2005). Three different families of distributions, belonging to
the three different domains of attraction for the maximum, have been considered and the
dependence of the optimal strategy and the optimal expected payoff has been investigated.
The different distributions can model various tendency in perception of the searched items.
In this paper the idea of payoff function dependent on the true value of the item is modified
to include the different personal costs of choice of the item. The cost of observation in
the secretary problem with payoffs dependent on the real ranks has been investigated
by Bartoszynski and Govindarajulu (1978) (see also Yeo (1998)). However, the cost of
decision is different problem than the cost of observation. It will be shown that the optimal
number of items one should skip is a function of this personal cost. At the last moment
the payoff function can be slightly differently defined than in Bearden (2006)’s paper.
The asymptotic expected return and asymptotic behaviour of the optimal strategy will
be studied.
The organization of the paper are as follows. In Section 2 the related to the secre-
tary problem Markov chain is formulated. This section is based mainly on the sug-
gestion from Dynkin and Yushkevich (1969) and the results by Szajowski (1982) and
Suchwa lko and Szajowski (2002). In the next sections the solution of the rank-based sec-
retary problem with cardinal payoff and the personal cost of grader is given. In Section 3
the exact and asymptotic solution is provided for the model formulated in Section 2. In
this consideration the asymptotic behaviour of the threshold defining the optimal strategy
of the grader is studied.
In the last section the comparison of obtained results are given.
2 Mathematical formulation of the model
Let us assume that the grader observes a sequence of up to N applicants whose values
are i.i.d. random variables {X1, X2, . . . , XN} with uniform distribution on E = [0, 1]. The
values of the applicants are not observed. Let us define
Rk = #{1 ≤ i ≤ k : Xi ≤ Xk}.
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The random variable Rk is called relative rank of k-th candidate with respect of items
investigated to the moment k. The grader can see the relative ranks instead of the true
values. All random variables are defined on a fixed probability space (Ω,F ,P). The ob-
servations of random variables Rk, k = 1, 2, . . . , N , generate the sequence of σ-fields
Fk = σ{R1, R2, . . . , Rk}, k ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , N}. The random variables Rk are indepen-
dent and P{Rk = i} = 1k .
Denote by MN the set of all Markov moments τ with respect to σ-fields {Fk}Nk=1. Let
q : T× S× E → ℜ+ be the gain function. Define
(1) vN = sup
τ∈MN
Eq(τ, Rτ , Xτ ).
We are looking for τ ∗ ∈ MN such that Eq(τ ⋆, Rτ∗ , Xτ∗) = vN .
Since {q(n,Rn, Xn)}Nn=1 is not adapted to the filtration {Fn}Nn=1, the gain function can be
substituted by the conditional expectation of the sequence with respect to the filtration
given. By property of the conditional expectation we have
Eq(τ, Rτ , Xτ ) =
N∑
r=1
∫
{τ=r}
q(τ, Rτ , Xτ )dP
=
N∑
r=1
∫
{τ=r}
E[q(r, Rr, Xr)|Fr]dP = Eg˜(τ, Rτ ),
where
(2) g˜(r, Rr) = E[q(r, Rr, Xr)|Fr]
for r = 1, 2, . . . , N . On the event {ω : Rr = s} we have g˜(r, s) = E[q(r, Rr, Xr)|Rr = s].
Assumption 1 In the sequel it is assumed that the grader wants to accept the best so far
applicant.
The function g˜(r, s) defined in (2) is equal to 0 for s > 1 and non-negative for s = 1.
It means that we can choose the required item at moments r only if Rr = 1. Denote
h(r) = g˜(r, 1).
The risk is connected with each decision of the grader. The personal feelings of the risk
are different. When the decision process is dynamic we can assume that the feeling of risk
appears randomly at some moment ξ. Its distribution is a model of concern for correct
choice of applicant.
Assumption 2 It is assumed that ξ has uniform distribution on {0, 1, . . . , N}.
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Remark 2.1 Let us assume that the cost of choice or the measure of stress related to the
decision of acceptance of the applicant is c. It appears when the decision is after ξ and its
measure will be random process C(t) = cI{ξ≥t}. Based on the observed process of relative
ranks and assuming that there are no acceptance before k we have
(3) c(k, t) = E[C(t)|Fk] = c N − t+ 1
N − k + 1 .
The applied model is a consequence of observation that the fear of the wrong decision today
is highest than the concern for the consequence of the future decision.
Assumption 3 The aim of the grader is to maximize the expected value of applicant
chosen and at the same time to minimize the cost of choice.
In this case the function
(4) q(t, Rt, Xt) = gc(t, Rt, Xt) =


(Xt − C(t))I{Rt=1}(Rt) if t < N ,
XN − c otherwise.
Since Xt are i.i.d. random variables with the uniform distribution on [0, 1] we have for
t ≥ r
g˜c(r, t, Rt) =E[gc(t, Rt, Xt)|Fr](5)
= (
t
t+ 1
− cN − t+ 1
N − r + 1)I{Rt=1}(Rt)
(see Resnick (1987)). Let us denote h˜(r, s) = g˜(r, s, 1).
Define W0 = 1, γt = inf{r > γt−1 : Yr = 1} (inf ∅ = ∞) and Wt = γt. If γt = ∞, then
define Wt =∞. Wt is the Markov chain with following one step transition probabilities
p(r, s) = P{Wt+1 = (s, 1)|Wt = (r, 1)} =


1
s
, if r = 1, s = 2,
r
s(s−1)
, if 1 < r < s,
0, if r ≥ s or r = 1, s 6= 2,
(6)
with p(∞,∞) = 1, p(r,∞) = 1 − ∑Ns=r+1 p(r, s). Let Gt = σ{W1,W2, . . . ,Wt} and M˜N
be the set of stopping times with respect to {Gt}Nt=1. Since γt is increasing, then we can
define M˜Nr+1 = {σ ∈ M˜N : γσ > r}.
Let Pr(·) be probability measure related to the Markov chain Wt, with trajectory starting
in state r and Er(·) the expected value with respect to P(r,1)(·). From (6) we can see that
the transition probabilities depend on moments r where items with relative rank 1 appears.
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Taking into account the form of the payoff function (5) the two dimensional Markov chain
should be considered. Denote Zt : Ω → T × T the Markov chain with the following one
step transition probabilities
P(Zt+1 = (s, j)|Zt = (s, i)) = i
j(j − 1) for s < i < j ≤ N ,(7a)
P(Zt+1 = (k, i)|Zt = (s, i)) = s
k(k − 1) for s < k < i ≤ N ,(7b)
and 0 otherwise.
Let us introduce the operators based on (7) and (6)
T h˜(r, s) = E(r,s)h˜(Z1) =
N−1∑
j=s+1
s
j(j − 1) h˜(r, j) +

1− N−1∑
j=s+1
s
j(j − 1)

 (1
2
− c),(8a)
Th(r) = Erh(W1) =
N−1∑
j=r+1
r
j(j − 1) h˜(r, j) +

1− N−1∑
j=r+1
r
j(j − 1)

 (1
2
− c).(8b)
3 The cost of fear in the rank-based secretary problem with cardinal value
of the item.
Let MNr = {τ ∈ MN : r ≤ τ ≤ N} and vN(r) = supτ∈MNr Egc(τ, Rτ , Xτ). The following
algorithm allows to construct the value of the problem vN . Let
(9) vN (N) = Egc(N,RN , XN) = E(XN)− c.
and for r < N
wN(r, s) = max{h˜(r, s), TwN(r, s)},(10a)
vN (r) = max{h(r), T vN(r)}.(10b)
One can consider the stopping sets
(11) Γr = {(r, s) : h(r, s) ≥ wN(r, s), r < s} ∪ {(r,N)},
r ∈ T. In class of such stopping sets there are solutions of restricted problem. Based
on this partial solution the optimal stopping time is constructed and it is shown that
vN = vN (1).
Lemma 3.1 For the considered problem with the payoff function (4) and c ∈ ℜ+, there
is k0 such that for r ≥ k0 the optimal stopping time τ ⋆ in MNr has a form τ ⋆ = inf{s ≥
r : Ys = 1} ∧N i.e. the stopping set is Γr = {(r, s) : s ≥ r, Yr = 1} ∪ {(r,N)}.
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Proof. The function h˜(k, r) = r
r+1
− cN−r+1
N−k+1
is increasing on r ≥ k. For r = N we
have wN(k,N) =
1
2
− c. Let us construct the one step look ahead stopping time and let us
define k0 = min{1 ≤ k ≤ N : h(s) ≥ Th(s) for every s ∈ [k,N ]. For j ≥ k ≥ k0 we have
h(k) ≤ h(j) ≤ h˜(k, j) and by definition of k0 we have h˜(k, j) ≥ h(k) ≥ Th(k) ≥ Th(k, j).
The value of the problem wN(k, r) = h˜(k, r) and the optimal stopping time on M
N
k0
is
defined by the stopping set Γk0. Therefore we have TvN(r) = Th(r) for r ≥ k0 and the
one step look ahead rule is optimal in MNk0.

Remark 3.2 Let us assume that s > k > k0. We take limits of
k
N
→ y and s
N
→ x as
N →∞. We get
h(y, x)= lim
k
N
→y; s
N
→x
N→∞
h˜(k, s) = 1− c1− x
1− y
h¯(y, x)= lim
k
N
→y; s
N
→x
N→∞
Th(k, s) = 1− x
2
− cx− 1− x
1− y c−
xc
1− y log(x).
For c ∈ (0,+∞) the equation log(y) = (y − 1)( 1
2c
+ 1) has one root α ∈ (0, 1). When
x ≥ y ≥ α then h¯(y, x) ≤ h(y, x).
The optimal stopping time τ ∗ is defined as follows: one have to stop at the first moment
r when Yr = 1, unless vN (r) > h(r). We can define the stopping set Γ = {r : h(r) ≥
vN(r)} ∪ {N}.
Theorem 3.3 For every c ∈ [0,+∞) there is k0 such that Γ = {r : r ≥ k0, Yr = 1}∪{N}
and vN = vN(k0 − 1).
Proof. The function h(r) = r
r+1
−c is increasing on r. For r = N we have vN (N) = 12−
c. Let us construct the one step look ahead stopping time and let us define k0 = min{1 ≤
k ≤ N : h(s) ≥ Th(s) for every s ∈ [k,N ]. For j ≥ k ≥ k0 we have h(k) ≤ h(j) ≤ h˜(k, j)
and by definition of k0 the value of the problem onM
N
k0−1
is equal to vN(k0−1) = Th(k0−1)
and the one step look ahead rule is optimal in this set of stopping times. For r ≤ k0 − 1
we have h(r) ≤ vN(k0 − 1). If we do not stop at the moment r < k0 − 1 we get
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vN(r) =
k0−1∑
j=r+1
r
j(j − 1)vN(k0 − 1)
+
r
k0 − 1

N−1∑
j=k0
k0 − 1
j(j − 1) h˜(k0 − 1, j) +

1− N−1∑
j=k0
k0 − 1
j(j − 1)

 (1
2
− c)


= rvN(k0 − 1)(1
r
− 1
k0 − 1) +
r
k0 − 1vN (k0 − 1) = vN(k0 − 1).
It shows that vN = vN(k0 − 1) and the stopping rule τ ⋆ = min{1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1 : r ≥
k0, Rr = 1} ∨N is optimal.

Table 1
Optimal strategy and expected payoff according Theorem 3.3 and 3.4.
N Cost of decision
c = 0 c = 110 c =
2
10
5 2 1320
∼= 0.65 2 343600 ∼= 0.571667 2 715 ∼= 0.466667
10 3 1115
∼= 0.733333 3 0.654224 4 0.566339
15 4 3140
∼= 0.775 4 0.69564 5 0.608834
50 7 0.868571 8 0.785822 9 0.70274
100 10 0.905446 12 0.819826 14 0.734604
∞ 0 1 [0.00251646N ] 0.9 [0.0340152N ] 0.8
Let the number of applicants be going to the infinity. When the cost c is positive the value
of the problem has limit less than 1 and the asymptotic threshold is bigger than 0.
Theorem 3.4 Let us assume that c ∈ (0,+∞). We have
(12) lim
k0
N
→α
N→∞
vN = 1− c− (c+ 1
2
)α− cα
1− α log(α)
and α is the unique solution of the equation log(x) = (1 + 1
2c
)(x− 1) in (0, 1).
Proof. It is a consequence of Theorem 3.3 and the observation from Remark 3.2.

Remark 3.5 It is also natural payoff structure when at the last moment N there are no
cost of decision and c ∈ [0, 1
2
). In this case the decision maker will hesitate longer before
he accepts the candidate than in the model with cost of decision at the last moment. A
numerical example is given in Table 2. The form of optimal strategy is the same. The
threshold k⋆0 is different. Its limit
k⋆
0
N
→ β fulfills the equation log(x) = 1
2c
(x− 1).
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Table 2
Optimal strategy and expected payoff when there is no cost at last moment.
N Cost of decision
c = 0 c = 110 c =
2
10
5 2 1320
∼= 0.65 3 35 ∼= 0.6 3 0.566667
10 3 1115
∼= 0.73333 4 0.679003 5 0.626485
15 4 3140
∼= 0.775 5 0.716322 6 0.662696
50 7 0.868571 9 0.799919 14 0.729829
100 10 0.905446 14 0.830076 22 0.755734
∞ 0 1 [0.00697715N ] 0.9 [0.107355N ] 0.8
4 Final remarks
The cost of decision included in this model gives parameter to measure the fear of grader
that his decision is too early. One can also imagine that the grader is able to observe the
true value of the item over some fixed threshold, the level of the price acceptable by him.
In this case, the value of the threshold determine the expected number of observation to
the acceptance (see Porosinski and Szajowski (2000)). Such partial observation is easy to
realize by human being and it is natural behaviour for many traders. They do not accept
prices belove some threshold.
In many real problems one can observe that the decision maker hesitates to long and
postpones the final decision. He rejects relatively best option too long. It looks that he
fears to loss the potential options. The level of fear can be dependent on the value of
the item or independent. The model of choice for such decision maker could be based
on the multicriteria optimal stopping models considered by Gnedin (1981), Ferguson
(1992), Samuels and Chotlos (1986) and recently by Sakaguchi and Szajowski (2000) and
Bearden et al. (2005). In this model the one variable is related to the value or rank of
the applicant being searched. The second coordinate would be a measure of undefined
risk related to the decision process which the decision maker is feeling. From this point
of view the research is needed to adopt the proper model for the considered case of the
item selection. It also open the theoretical investigation to formulate variation of the best
choice selection.
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